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The Competitive Effects of Ownership of Financial 
Transmission Rights in a Deregulated Electricity Industry 
Manho Joung *, Ross Baldick*, and You Seok Son ** 
In this paper ; we investigate how generators' ownership of financial 
transmission rights (FTRs) may influence the effects of the transmission lines on 
competition. In order for concrete analysis , a simple symmetric market model is 
introduced and FTRs are modeled in two different forms: FTR options and FTR 
obligations. This paper shows that introducing FTRs in an appropriate manner 
may reduce the physical capacity needed for the full benefits of competition. 
Among the competitive effects of ownership of FTRs , we focus on the effects on 
two possible pure strategy equilibria: the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium 
and the passive/aggressive equilibrium. We also analyze an extension of the 
model: asymmetric markets. Finally , a numerical illustration of applying the 
analysis is presented. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the electricity industry is being restructured around the world. 
As restructuring continues to deepen, economic agents in the industry are interested 
in the impact of the unique characteristics ofelectricity on competitive electricity 
markets. One of the most important elements in a deregulated electricity industry 
with respect to competition among the generators is electric transmission facilities. 
Much research has focused on understanding the roles of transmission 
networks in a deregulated electricity industry. Borenstein et al. (2000) studied the 
competitive effects of a transmission line that connects two electricity markets. 
They showed that there may be no direct relationship between the competitive 
effect of a transmission line and the actual line flow on the line. Moreover, with 
a sufficiently large capacity line, the full benefits of competition can be achieved 
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even in cases where the equilibrium line flow is zero. For sufficiently large line ca- 
pacity, the market outcome is equivalent to the case where the markets are merged; 
that is, where there is unlimited capacity between the markets. Their work also 
included an empirical analysis of the California electricity market modeled as a 
duopoly. Willems (2002) studied a very similar market model to that of Borenstein 
et al. and investigated the role of the network operator for promoting competition 
among the generators. Quick and Carey (2001) applied the "dominant firm price- 
leadership model" to assess market power in Colorado's electricity industry and 
showed that strategies exist to reduce market power. Leautier (2000) studied 
regulatory contracts for the operators of transmission etworks and proposed a 
regulatory contract that induces network operators to "optimally" expand the grid. 
Stoft (1999) investigated market power issues when the generators serve 
a demand with capacity constrained transmission lines. He considered the effect on 
market power of financial transmission rights (FTRs) and the resulting distribution 
of the congestion rent. Joskow and Tirole (2000) also analyzed the market power 
effect of the allocation of transmission line rights in a more general context. In 
their work, they also discussed possible regulatory mechanisms. Cho (2003) in- 
vestigated the competitive equilibrium in electricity markets over a network with 
finite capacity. He suggested a tool to check whether an equilibrium is efficient. 
He also examined markets for firm transmission rights in a market with a specific 
structure. Most recently, Gilbert et al. (2004) studied the market power effects 
of the transmission rights. In their work, the analysis has been performed for a 
simple two-node network model as well as for meshed networks. 
In many restructured electricity markets, FTRs are used to hedge volatil- 
ity in locational marginal price differences. In this paper, we analyze the effects 
of ownership of FTRs on the strategic behavior of the electricity generators in a 
Cournot framework. Following Borenstein et al. (2000), we primarily consider two 
markets that are identical in every respect, but geographically distinct. These two 
markets are linked by a single transmission line. We assume that each market has 
an identical monopoly supplier whose costs are identical to each other. The frame- 
work is similar to that of Borenstein et al. (2000), but generalizes it by consider- 
ing transmission rights. We provide unified results by considering various FTR 
models, analyzing the effect on competition of FTR ownership by generators. 
Joskow and Tirole (2000) also studied FTRs using a two-market model. 
Pritchard and Philpott (2005) considered a very similar model. However, in their 
analysis, they assumed that only one market has a demand and the other has only 
suppliers. They considered several alternative market power configurations; how- 
ever, these are limited to monopolistic and oligopolistic ompetition only in one 
market with the other market competitive. This does not model the competitive 
effects of transmission rights in the more typical case where generators in both 
markets are imperfectly competing. 
Cho (2003) analyzed electricity markets for firm transmission rights by a 
simple two-stage market model. This model consists of the first stage transmission 
right market and the second stage energy market. In this model, Cho assumed that 
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players behave strategically in the first stage, but that they are price takers in the 
second stage. By analyzing equilibria, he showed that inefficient equilibria may 
exist. However, the market structure in his model is different from that of most 
actual electricity markets and his results cannot be directly applied to realistic 
electricity markets. 
Gilbert et al. (2004) proposed a three stage game model considering first 
transmission right allocation and then trading, and finally output determination i  
the energy market. The model is solved backward, starting with the energy market. 
However, their proposed market model, in particular, the two-node network model 
is limited in the following manner. The model considers competition among the 
generators located only in one market and assumes the other market is perfectly 
competitive. As in Joskow and Tirole's model (Joskow and Tirole, 2000), this 
does not model the competitive effects of transmission rights when generators in 
different markets are imperfectly competing. Moreover, the transmission link is 
assumed always to be used at full capacity. Since this limitation will affect he re- 
sults of each stage of the game and, in particular, affect he analysis of the energy 
market, which is the basis of their backward analysis, the final results may also 
be limited. 
Many game-theoretic studies focused on the competitive effects of FTRs 
have tried to address mixed strategy equilibria. Borenstein et al. (2000) discussed 
it based on a numerical method. Gilbert et al. (2004) presented analytic results for 
mixed strategy equilibria but, due to the limitation of the model, their study could 
not be applied to the analysis of the competitive effects of transmission rights 
when generators in different markets are imperfectly competing. To the best of 
the authors' knowledge, no study so far has been performed for mixed strategy 
equilibria explicitly when generators in different markets are imperfectly compet- 
ing under the transmission capacity constraint. 
In this paper, we examine interactions between two incompletely 
competitive markets. In order to analyze the interplay of firms, a game-theoretic 
model, specifically a Cournot competition model, is adopted. In this setup, by 
examining best response curves, the effects of ownership of FTRs on achieving 
the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium are investigated. We show that by endow- 
ing generating firms with FTRs in an appropriate manner, from the generator to 
another market, the amount of the connecting line capacity needed for the full 
benefits of competition can be less than suggested by Borenstein et al.'s work. 
This direction of FTR hedges exposure to prices in the generator's market, miti- 
gating its market power. In contrast, if generating firms possess FTRs from anoth- 
er market o the generator then there is a negative effect on competition. The latter 
FTR increases exposure to prices in the generator's market, increasing its market 
power. We also extend the model to include analysis of asymmetric markets and 
where one of the markets is competitive. 
In Section 2, we describe the market model with two identical markets and 
two identical firms. In Section 3, we introduce the reference model without FTRs 
and then, following Hogan (2002), two different models: the FTR option model and 
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the FTR obligation model. We analyze the best responses and possible equilibria in 
each model. The effects of each FTR model on pure strategy equilibrium are also 
investigated and policy implications for FTR ownership rules discussed. In Section 
4, we extend FTR models first by considering asymmetry of markets and second 
by assuming that one of the markets is perfectly competitive. Section 5 presents a 
numerical example, and, finally, section 6 summarizes our results. 
2. MARKET MODEL 
Following Borenstein et al. (2000), we consider a model of two identical 
markets. Demand in each market is assumed to be identical and to be characterized 
by the same inverse-demand function denoted by P : #t+® 9t+. These two markets 
are linked by a single transmission line whose capacity is K. In each market here 
is a single generating firm. We also assume that both firms have an identical cost 
function C : 3t+® 9t+. The transmission line is operated by a third entity and the 
pricing follows the nodal pricing rules (Schweppe et al., 1988) . Both generating 
firms try to maximize their profits by employing quantity strategies (Cournot). 
In order for the model to be more concrete, we make the following 
assumptions: 
• The inverse demand P(q) in each market is represented by an affine curve with 
a negative slope: 
P(q) = -a q + |3, where a, |3 E 9i+, (1) 
• Generating firms' generating costs C(q) are represented by a convex quadratic 
function: 
C(q) = -al 2 q1 + bq + c, where a, cE 9t+, and b E 91 (2) 
3. COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF FINANACIAL TRANSMISSION 
RIGHTS 
In this section, we derive analytical expressions for the best response of 
each firm for a reference model without financial transmission rights (in section 
3.1) and for two models of financial transmission rights (FTR) (Hogan, 2002): 
the FTR option model (in section 3.2.1) and the FTR obligation model (in section 
3.2.2). We also analyze the competitive effects of the corresponding financial 
transmission rights for each model using best response analysis. However, for 
the brevity of the paper, we only present the detailed analysis for the reference 
model and the FTR option model. For the FTR obligation model, only the results 
are summarized. 
Following Borenstein et al. (2000), for the best response analysis, we 
define two categories of optimal responses: optimal aggressive output and optimal 
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passive output. First, suppose that firm i is in the situation such that he opponent, 
firm y, is producing nothing (more generally, that firm j is producing so little energy 
that there is transmission congestion on the line in the direction from market i to 
market j). In this case, the best response of firm i is to produce its optimal quantity 
given that the line is congested from / to j. Under the nodal pricing scheme, this 
quantity will be the same as the monopoly output for firm i when the market is 
isolated but with the demand shifted to the right by K. We call this the optimal 
aggressive output for i and denote it with a superscript +. 
Now, suppose that firm i is in the situation such that the opponent, firm j , 
is producing a great amount of electric power (more generally, firm j is producing 
enough energy to cause line congestion from market j to market /). In this case, 
the best response of firm i is to produce its optimal quantity given that the line 
is congested in the direction from market j to market /. Under the nodal pricing 
scheme, this quantity will be the monopoly output for firm i when the market is 
isolated with the demand shifted to the left by K. This monopoly quantity is called 
the optimal passive output for i and will be denoted with a superscript 
Besides the optimal aggressive and passive outputs, one more 
category of best response behavior is needed to cover the uncongested case. Since 
the resulting quantity is equivalent to the unconstrained Cournot best response 
output for the merged markets, we call this output the Cournot best response 
output and denote it with a superscript C. 
An FTR is a financial contract for collecting an amount of money determined 
by the difference b tween two nodal prices. We define the "direction" of FTRs from 
the point of view of the generating firm that holds the transmission rights. We say 
the "sourcing" direction for FTRs that are in the direction from the market where 
the right holding enerating firm is located to the other market. That is, the payoff 
of sourcing FTRs is defined by the nodal price in the other market minus the nodal 
price at the generator. We call the opposite direction the "sinking" direction. That is, 
the payoff of sinking FTRs is defined by the nodal price at the generator minus price 
in the other market. These two directions are illustrated inFig. 1 . 
Figure 1. FTR Directions   
Right Holder Sourcing Direction 
Sinking Direction 
3.1 Reference Model 
As a reference model, we consider the case such that neither firm has any 
rights on the transmission line. We will denote the reference case with a super- 
script r. In this case, the optimal aggressive and passive outputs, and the Cournot 
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best response output, which are denoted by qr'K ), qr'(K ), and q"c{q^ respectively, 
are expressed by (3), (4) and (5).1 
p + cx K-b 
q»(K)=  , (3) 2a + a 
B-a K-b 
qr~ (K) =  , (4) 2a + a 
a 6 - /? 
< (<?p 3 = 
- - - - +  . (5) 
2(a + a) a + a 
Here, we can observe that the function qr+ is increasing in its argument 
while the function qr~ and the function q.rC are both decreasing in their argument 
(Note that qr+ and qr~. are functions of line capacity K , while q.rC is a function of 
production by the other firm, qy). 
This reference model is equivalent to the symmetric two-firm odel of 
Borenstein et al. (2000). This section serves to review their esults. The line will 
be congested only when the difference b tween the outputs of two firms is greater 
than 2 K, since otherwise, by transferring a smaller amount of electricity than the 
line capacity K , the two markets' prices would be equalized. 
Let us consider the best response of firm i with respect to the other firm 
/ s strategy, q.. When firm j is producing any amount up to qr+ (K) -2K, firm i can 
maximize its profit by producing the fixed amount qr+ (K) -2 K. As firm / s output 
increases above qr+ ( K) -2 K, however, firm i can maximize its profit and still 
export K by producing 2 K more than firm j. That is, firm i maximizes its profit 
by producing q. + 2 K, accounting for the segment of slope 1 in the best responses 
shown in Fig. 2. Note that as q. keeps increasing, firm V s resulting payoff from 
maintaining an aggressive response is decreasing. As firm fs output continues to 
increase, we can think of two situations. 
On the one hand, if K is small, then producing the optimal passive output 
qr~ (K) becomes more profitable for firm i before the value of q. = q. + 2 K reaches 
the unconstrained Cournot best response q'c (q). This is shown by the dashed 
curve in Fig. 2. 
On the other hand, if the line capacity is large enough, say, K' > K as 
shown in Fig. 2 as the solid curve, then firm /' s best response will change from q. 
+ 2 K to qr.c (#,). However, even in this situation, as q. keeps increasing, producing 
qr~ ( K ) will eventually be more profitable for firm i than producing qr.c (q .). This 
accounts for the transition i the best responses to qr~ (K') and qr~ (K ), respectively, 
for high enough q.. 
1 .There isno case where (3) and (4) are achieved inan equilibrium in a symmetric model; however, 
in an asymmetric model, passive/aggressive quilibria are possible, in which case a pair of (3) and (4) 
will be an equilibrium output pair. 
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To summarize, the situations for the two values of line capacity are 
illustrated in Fig. 2. The solid curve shows the case of relatively large capacity 
K' where firm V s optimal response includes some values equal to the Cournot 
unconstrained best response. The dashed curve shows the case of relatively small 
capacity K where the best response never includes values equal to the Cournot 
unconstrained best response. 
Figure 2. Best Response Curves For Firm i ( K < K'). 
a i 1 ' i 
 
~ BR with K 1 ' curve 4, I ' ' ' - BR curve with K 
 1-  ' 
1  1 
I ' 
I ' 
I '  r ' 
/ ' 
' /' 
( I / 
' rrained 





- 1 - ■ - ' 
^ 
q"(K') q"(K) <T(*) ^+(^') 
As shown in Fig. 2, the best responses of both firms will have different 
characteristics according to the transmission line capacity K. Specifically, increase 
of physical line capacity implies both increase of the optimal aggressive output 
qr'K) and decrease of the optimal passive output qr (FT). Borenstein et al. (2000) 
shows that his, in turn, implies an increase in the competion-promoting effects of 
the transmission line: 
• decrease in the equilibrium price of the mixed strategy equilibrium, and 
• increase in the range of market demand conditions that result in the pure 
strategy Cournot equilibrium. 
The results of Borenstein et al. (2000) also shows that if K is very 
small, then there is no pure strategy equilibrium, while if K is large enough, the 
Cournot duopoly equilibrium will be reached as the unique equilibrium. That is, 
the equilibrium is specified by (5), with zero flow along the line but with the line 
providing the full competitive benefits of merged markets. 
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3.2 FTR Option and Obligation Models 
An FTR option is a financial contract for collecting the amount of money 
determined by the locational price difference and the share of the right. This option 
gives the owner the right to collect a portion of the congestion rents when the price 
difference is positive, but does not require payment when the price difference is
negative. 
An FTR option has a specified exercise direction and if the nodal price 
difference is positive in this direction, then the FTR provides a positive payoff. 
There is zero payoff for price differences inthe other direction. This means that 
each firm i has two possible directions for his FTR option in this two market 
model; that is, a direction from market i to j (the sourcing direction) and one from 
j to i (the sinking direction). We analyze each directional FTR option separately. 
FTR options are implemented in the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ER- 
COT) zonal balancing market as "flowgate" rights (ERCOT, 2005) and are being 
introduced in several other markets in the United States, including the ERCOT 
"nodal" market in 2009 (ERCOT, 2006). 
An FTR obligation is a similar financial contract o an FTR option, but 
it has negative payoff if the nodal prices reverse. That is, if the price difference is
positive, a holder collects the congestion rents of the transmission line, while for 
the negative price difference, the holder makes a payment. Obligation-type rights 
also have two possible directions. FTR obligations are implemented in several 
markets in the Eastern US, including PJM (PJM, 2005), and will also be available 
in the ERCOT nodal market (ERCOT, 2006). 
For the brevity of the paper, the detailed analysis is presented only for the 
FTR option model. For the FTR obligation model, only a summary of the results 
of the analysis is provided while the detailed analysis is presented in Joung's dis- 
sertation (Joung, 2008). 
3.2.1 FTR Option Model 
Let r'!J and r'f denote generating firm /' s FTR option share from mar- 
ket i to j and from market j to i , respectively, such that r'!j, r )!j E [0,1]. That is, 
r].y describes the share of sourcing FTR, while ri/f describes the share of sinking 
FTRs. We use superscript uo to denote options. 
We have: 
Lemma 1. Let q"olJ+ , q™ij~ , and q"oijC be the optimal aggressive, passive, 
and Cournot responses for firm i holding share r]!j. Let q™ij+ , q™ij~, and quoijC be 
the optimal aggressive, passive, and Cournot responses for firm i holding share 
r'f. Then: 
q"oij+ (K, r'ij) = qr+ ((1 + r'!j)K), (6) 
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(7) 
quoijC _ qrC ^ 
q"oji+ (K) = qr+ (K), (9) 
q^~ (K, r'f) = qr~ (( 1 + r'?)K), (10) 
q"ojlC {q) = qf {q), (11) 
Proof: See Joung's dissertation (Joung, 2008) 
Lemma 1 suggests that the ownership of an FTR option is equivalent to 
expanding the capacity of the line in one direction. This specific relationship is 
mainly from the linearity of demand. When we relax the demand linearity, this 
relationship would change, but we would expect a similar qualitative effect. 
To summarize, an FTR option results in the change of either the optimal 
aggressive output (see (6)) or optimal passive output (see (10)) compared to the 
reference model. By possessing an y'ij FTR option, firm V s optimal aggressive 
output increases as indicated by (6), observing that by (3), qr+ is increasing in 
its argument. By possessing an r'f FTR option, firm /' s optimal passive output 
decreases as indicated by (10), observing that by (4), qr~ is decreasing in its 
argument. The change of the best response due to an FTR option is illustrated in 
Fig. 3. Note that, in order to differentiate two different response curves in Fig. 3, 
there are some line segments that are illustrated as being close together although 
they are in fact coincident. 
As shown in Fig. 3, according to its direction, each FTR option has one of 
two different effects: either increase of the optimal aggressive output as shown in 
Fig. 3(a) or decrease of the optimal passive output as shown in Fig. 3(b). This, in 
turn, affects the range of conditions for realization of the pure strategy equilibrium. 
Here, we focus on the effect on the occurrence of three forms of equilibrium: the 
unconstrained Cournot equilibrium, passive/aggressive equilibrium, and mixed 
strategy equilibrium (Borenstein et al., 2000). We do not consider overlapping 
equilibria as described in the work of Borenstein et al. (2000). 
Increase of the optimal aggressive output has no effect on achieving the 
unconstrained Cournot equilibrium since the unconstrained Cournot best response 
region is the same as that in the reference case and the range of conditions for the 
unconstrained Cournot equilibrium will be also the same as shown in Fig. 3(a). On 
the other hand, decrease of the optimal passive output reduces the unconstrained 
Cournot best response region since the right holder becomes more inclined to the 
optimal passive output. That is, the transition of its best response from the uncon- 
strained Cournot response to the optimal passive output occurs at a smaller value 
of the other firm's output as shown in Fig. 3(b). 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Best Response Curves 
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I x ' r= 
 
reference mod l 1 
I '  " ' | ' uni directional FTR ■ ' option moaei w tn 7f 
I  ' ' 
' 
' 
^ > ' • Unconstrained ' 
^ Cournot q (A)-2A | ^best-response 
I 
I '  1  1  II  ' » 
l,:" q ( A' ) (A') = </■""" (A') qt 
(b) Best Response Curves for firm /' without FTRs and with n" . 
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Consider a case where, without FTRs, the capacity of the transmission 
line is enough to achieve the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium. Fig. 4(a) 
illustrates this case. From the previous argument, if firm i possesses an r'f FTR 
option and/or firm j possesses an r^7 FTR option, then the resulting equilibrium 
will be the same as the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium in the reference case 
as shown in Fig. 4(b). 
In contrast, suppose that firm i possesses an r'f FTR option. In this case, 
the resulting equilibrium ay change from the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium 
to a mixed strategy equilibrium. This is illustrated in Fig. 4(c). Fig. 4(c) shows 
that by i possessing an r'f FTR option, the change of best response curve of firm 
i may result in a mixed strategy equilibrium instead of the unconstrained Cournot 
equilibrium that is achieved without FTRs (Fig. 4(a)). A similar effect can occur 
if firm j possesses an r'!j FTR option. 
However, for the range of t'!j E [0,1], the introduction ofFTR options 
cannot create enough asymmetry to yield a passive/aggressive equilibrium. 
Lemma 2. Suppose that, without FTRs, the capacity of the transmission 
line is enough to achieve the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium. In this case, by 
firm /' s possessing an r'f FTR option, the resulting equilibrium cannot change to 
a passive/aggressive equilibrium. 
Proof: Suppose that, with firm V s possessing an r'f FTR option, a pas- 
sive/aggressive equilibrium is achieved. Then, the price difference P (q^qp, be- 
tween two markets is obtained as: 
Figure 4. Illustration of the Effects of FTR Options on the Cournot 
Equilibrium  
▲ ' ' 
<7, ^^^Unconst rained Cournot best-response fu ctions ^ ^ •> ' ' ' , N ' ' ' • ' Cournot ' 
^ J equilibrium ' 
br') 
*'BRHq,) ' ' 
' 
  * <7, 
(a) Best Response Curves Without FTRs. 
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Figure 4. Illustration of the Effects of FTR Options on the Cournot 
Equilibrium (continued) 
A ' ' 
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b) Best Response Curves With FTR option rfl and ij '' . 
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' ^^^Unconstrained Cournot best- response functions 
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(c) Best Response Curves With FTR option rjf . 
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This contradicts he assumption of achieving a passive/aggressive equi- 
librium since, with negative price difference, FTR options will not generate any 
additional payoffs and, therefore, firm i's best response will not become the opti- 
mal passive output. 
Q.E.D. 
3.2.2 FTR Obligation Models 
Similar analysis to that in section 3.2.1 shows that an FTR obligation in 
the sourcing direction will have a positive effect on achieving the unconstrained 
Cournot equilibrium by increasing the unconstrained Cournot best response 
region. On the other hand, an FTR obligation in the sinking direction will have a 
negative effect on achieving the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium. 
3.3 Summary 
We have analyzed the competitive effects of two forms of FTRs: FTR 
option, and FTR obligation. We considered how ownership of FTRs change 
the players' best responses and investigated the corresponding equilibrium by 
considering the intersection of both players' best responses. 
First consider FTR options in the sourcing direction. Such FTR options 
do not change the range of conditions under which the Cournot response is the 
best response and so they do not have any effect on achieving the unconstrained 
Cournot equilibrium. Under the assumption that without FTRs the unconstrained 
Cournot equilibrium is achieved, such FTR options do not change the resulting 
equilibrium and so result in the same unconstrained Cournot equilibrium. 
On the other hand, consider FTR options in the sinking direction. Such 
FTR options decrease the range of conditions under which the Cournot response 
is the best response and therefore make the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium 
less likely to be achieved. Such FTR options may result in a mixed strategy 
equilibrium instead of the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium. However, they can- 
not result in a passive/aggressive equilibrium. 
Now consider FTR obligations in the sourcing direction. Such FTR obli- 
gations increase the range of conditions under which the Cournot response is the 
best response, making the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium more likely to be 
achieved. On the other hand, FTR obligations in the sinking direction decrease the 
range of conditions under which the Cournot response is the best response. 
The results for FTR options and obligations are different toeach other 
even in the cases where both types of FTR may yield the same payoffs to the 
right holder at equilibrium since we do not restrict the direction of flow when we 
analyze equilibrium. The following table summarizes the results. The effect of an 
FTR is deemed to be "good" if it increase the range of conditions under which 
the Cournot response is the best response, and, therefore, an FTR has positive 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.53 on Fri, 19 Sep 2014 13:08:47 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
178 / The Energy Journal 
effect on achieving the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium. On the other hand, 
it is deemed to be "bad" if it decreases the range of conditions under which the 
Cournot response is the best response. 
Table 1. Competitive Effects for Each FTR Model 
(B: bad effect, G:good effect, N:no effect) 
Sinking direction Sourcing direction 
FTR option B N 
FTR obligation B G 
Ownership of FTRs in the sinking direction owned by generating firms 
is uniformly bad. However, such FTRs have no role in hedging risk for the owner 
since they involve the increasing exposure of the firm to nodal prices at its loca- 
tion. From a policy perspective, such ownership of FTRs should be discouraged, 
as implied by the results of Gilbert et al. (2004). 
On the other hand, ownership of FTRs in the sourcing direction by gen- 
erating firms is uniformly good (FTR obligations) or has no effect (FTR options). 
Such FTRs hedge risk for the generating firm by reducing the exposure of the firm 
to nodal prices at its location. Such ownership of FTRs should be encouraged. 
In several markets, uch as ERCOT, there are limitations on the posses- 
sion of FTRs that are aimed at mitigating market power. However, these limita- 
tions are typically independent of the location of the owner. The results in this 
section indicate that such a policy is inappropriate, both because it allows a gen- 
erating firm to own FTRs in the sinking direction and also because it limits the 
ownership of sourcing FTRs by generating firms. To implement such a policy 
considering the location of the owner, there would need to be rules on acquiring 
FTRs both in an initial allocation auction and in any secondary market. 
4. MODEL EXTENSION: ASYMMETRIC MARKETS 
In the work of Borenstein et al. (2000), several extensions of the 
reference model were provided and analyzed. Most of them are also valid in other 
FTR models in a straightforward manner. In this paper, we comment on only the 
extension to asymmetric markets. However, Joung's dissertation (Joung, 2008) 
provides the extension to the case where one of the markets is competitive. 
Borenstein et al. (2000) showed that for the reference model, if markets 
are asymmetric enough, then even a very thin transmission line can provide a 
pure strategy equilibrium: a passive/aggressive equilibrium. Moreover, they 
showed that, with a sufficiently large line, the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium 
is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium and that this is the same as the case of 
symmetric markets. 
With our other FTR models, under certain conditions, a passive/aggressive 
equilibrium is possible even for the case where, without ownership of FTRs, the 
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unconstrained Cournot equilibrium is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium. This 
shows that FTRs may effectively increase asymmetry of markets that, otherwise, 
is not enough to yield a passive/aggressive equilibrium. However, by the same 
reasoning as for the reference model, with a sufficiently arge line capacity, the 
unconstrained Cournot equilibrium will be the unique pure-strategy equilibrium 
even with FTRs. Furthermore, results in Table 1 also hold for the asymmetric 
market case. 
Consider a case where, without FTRs, asymmetry of markets is small 
enough to achieve the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium. Fig. 5(a) illustrates this 
case. Suppose that firm i possesses an r)f FTR option. In this case, the resulting 
equilibrium ay change from the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium to a passive/ 
aggressive strategy equilibrium. This is illustrated in Fig. 5(b). Fig. 5(b) shows 
that by i possessing an y)J.' FTR option, asymmetry of markets increases enough 
to result in a passive/aggressive equilibrium instead of the unconstrained Cournot 
equilibrium that is achieved without FTRs (Fig. 5(a)). Results in Table 1 also hold 
for this case. 
Figure 5. Illustration of the Effects of FTR Options on the 
Cournot Equilibrium 
A ' ' </, ^^^Unconstrained Cournot best- response functions 
' ' V . 
' ' • Cournot ' 
"v J equilibrium ' 
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(a) Best Response Curves Without FTRs. 
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Figure 5. Illustration of the Effects of FTR Options on the 
Cournot Equilibrium (continued) 
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(b) Best Response Curves With FTR Option Tjj1 . 
5. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
In this section, we present a numerical example for an asymmetric mar- 
ket that will help to make concrete the results from the previous sections. In this 
example, we consider varying demand in asymmetric markets and the inverse 
demand of each market is as follows: 
Pfa) = -5? + 5(3, (13) 
/>.(<?) = -0.5<? + 0.5(3, 
where the inverse-demand duration curve d(p) for (3 is as shown in Fig. 6. 
The cost function of each firm is as follows: 
q 2 q 
J-'. 
(14) 
w = -£n+l- 
The capacity of the transmission line K is set to 3. With this setup, the 
market i is always an importing market at equilibrium whenever there is a flow on 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.53 on Fri, 19 Sep 2014 13:08:47 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Competitive Effects of Ownership of Financial Transmission Rights / 181 
Figure 6. Inverse-Demand Duration Curve 
the transmission line. In this example, the mixed strategy equilibrium is computed 
using the fictitious play method escribed by Borenstein et al. (2000). Fig. 7 shows 
the expected price of each market as a function of the different values of |3 for the 
reference case; that is, without FTRs. 
Figure 7. Expected Price Curves in the Reference Case 
9 r   market i's xpected price - market j's xpected price / B -  jS 
• o 6- / x Q. S T3 c© b - / o X ® / a. / x / a> 4 . ( 
3 - / _    
2 ̂  ^ 
1 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 
We consider FTR ownership of the generating firm in the importing mar- 
ket. We also consider 2different cases according to the rights direction. For brevity 
of the paper, the detailed result is presented by expected price curve graphs only 
for the first case: FTR ownership of the generating firm in the importing market 
in the sinking direction. 
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5.1 Case 1: FTR Ownership of the Generating Firm in the 
Sinking Direction 
In this case, firm i owns all the FTRs in the sinking direction. Both FTR 
models have the same results and Fig. 8 shows the results of the FTR option model 
compared with those of the reference case. Fig. 8(a) shows the expected price at 
market i and Fig. 8(b) shows the expected price at market j. In both markets, the 
expected price with FTRs is always higher than or equal to, and is never lower 
than that without FTRs for each possible value of (3. 
5.2 Case 2: FTR Ownership of the Generating Firm in the 
Sourcing Direction 
In this case, firm i owns all the amount of FTRs in the sourcing direction. 
The FTR option model does not have any effect on the expected price. For the 
FTR obligation model, the expected price at any market for FTR obligation case 
will not be higher than the expected price for reference case for each value of p. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
As stated in the work of Borenstein et al. (2000), the full benefits of 
competition can be achieved by connecting two markets with a sufficiently large 
capacity line so that each generator would compete over the merged market instead 
of over a residual market of its own. In this paper, we have demonstrated how to 
analyze the impact of ownership of FTRs on competition, and showed that, by 
introducing FTRs in an appropriate manner, the physical capacity needed for the 
full benefits of competition can be reduced. It has also shown that, by introducing 
FTRs, we may reduce the required physical capacity of the transmission line that 
is necessary to achieve a pure strategy equilibrium, particularly for achieving the 
unconstrained Cournot equilibrium that gives the full benefits of competition of a 
merged market. We have provided separate results for an FTR option model and 
for an FTR obligation model in this paper and the supplementary document. 
We also extended the FTR models by considering asymmetric markets 
and by assuming that one of the markets is perfectly competitive. Asymmetry of 
markets makes it possible for the ownership of FTRs to change market equilib- 
rium from the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium to a passive/aggressive equilib- 
rium. By constraining one market o be competitive, we can show a similar esult 
to that in the work of Joskow and Tirole (2000). Moreover, other esults from the 
same model are also obtained and some of them show that FTRs may reduce the 
firm's market power while Joskow and Tirole showed only the result of enhancing 
the firm's market power. Based on the model, we also analyzed the competitive 
effects of ownership of FTRs in asymmetric markets in order for more practi- 
cal applications of the theory. Competitive effects of each FTR model are evalu- 
ated and policy implications discussed. A numerical illustration of applying the 
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Figure 8. Expected Price Curves In Case 1 
analysis is presented. 
Finally, we observe that our model has assumed particular ownership 
of FTRs. In future work, we plan to analyze the incentives for acquiring FTRs 
and for entering into forward energy contracts. FTRs can be considered to be 
forward contracts for transmission service. We plan to investigate whether esults 
analogous to Allaz and Vila ( 1 993), where the joint equilibrium in the forward and 
spot market is more competitive than the spot market alone, also hold for FTRs. 
15  .  ■  .  1  >  q  reference case  FTR option case 
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(b) Expected price curves at market j. 
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